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Abstract: This paper1 is a response to the following ques-
tion: how can we listen to, render audible, and thus resist 
the kind of erasures and institutional forms of oblivion 
imposed by power and political structures in Latin 
America? I propose to answer this question through the 
study of literary and artistic responses to a paradigmatic 
case of this kind of oblivion in the history of Colombia, 
namely, the matanza de las bananeras. By following the 
ways in which the case has been “recovered” in its unde-
cidable character, first in One Hundred Years of Solitude, 
by Gabriel García Márquez, and then in José Alejandro 
Restrepo’s Musa Paradisíaca, I intend to show a concrete 
example of why, as Arendt suggests, “in their stubborn-
ness, facts are superior to power,” and that “persuasion 
and violence can destroy truth, but they can never replace 
it.” I begin my argument with a discussion of Ángela 
Uribe’s use of the case of the matanza and her treatment 
of García Márquez’s depiction as a refutation of Arendt’s 
statement. I take Uribe’s analysis as a provocation to 
build my own reading of the kind of memory and survival 
of the matanza made possible by García Márquez’s novel, 
and continued by Restrepo’s installation. I conclude by 
showing how, in both cases, the matanza stubbornly re-
sists oblivion, even though, as Arendt suggests, the his-
torical truth has indeed been destroyed. 
    
Keywords: Gabriel García Márquez, Hannah Arendt, 
Ángela Uribe, José Alejandro Restrepo, masacre de las 
bananeras. 
 
  
“La poesía … esa energía secreta de la vida cotidiana, que cuece 
los garbanzos en la cocina, y contagia el amor y repite las imágenes en 
los espejos.”2 
“La peligrosa memoria de nuestros pueblos [...] es una energía ca-
paz de mover el mundo.”3 
Gabriel García Márquez 
 
 
1. One Hundred Years of Solitude and the ambiguous 
case of the “matanza de las bananeras” 
 
Let me begin with a scene of one of the final chapters of 
One Hundred Years of Solitude. The scene is told from 
the perspective of José Arcadio Segundo, who by then has 
become one of the main leaders in the big union strike 
against the American banana company in the region. 
What is then recounted with extreme detail here are, ac-
cording to the words that open the chapter, “the events 
that would deal Macondo its fatal blow” (García Márquez 
1972, 298). After a whole month of strikes, and more than 
a year of failed negotiations with the representatives of 
the company, who have entirely ignored the nine points of 
the petition signed by the union, the workers are asked to 
get together in Macondo. They have been promised that 
the civil leader of the province will arrive by train to 
intercede on their behalf with the company. This is the 
context where the following passage takes place: 
  
José Arcadio Segundo was in the crowd that had gathered at the 
station on Friday since early in the morning. He had taken part 
in a meeting of union leaders and had been commissioned, along 
with Colonel Gavilán, to mingle in the crowd and orient it ac-
cording to how things went. [...] Around twelve o’clock, more 
than three thousand people, workers, women, and children, had 
spilled out of the open space in front of the station and were 
pressing into the neighboring streets, which the army had closed 
off with rows of machine guns. [...] An army lieutenant then 
climbed up onto the roof of the station where there were four 
machine-gun emplacements aiming at the crowd and called for 
silence. [...] the lieutenant read Decree No. 4 of the civil and 
military leader of the province through an old phonograph horn. 
It had been signed by General Carlos Cortés Vargas and his 
secretary, Major Enrique García Isaza, and in three articles of 
eighty words he declared the strikers to be a “bunch of hood-
lums” and he authorized the army to shoot to kill.  
[...] Fourteen machine guns answered at once. But it all see-
med like a farce. [...] A seismic voice, a volcanic breath, the roar 
of a cataclysm broke out in the center of the crowd with a great 
potential of expansion. [...] José Arcadio Segundo fell with his 
face bathed in blood, before the colosal troop wiped out the 
empty space, the light of the high, drought-stricken sky, and the 
whorish world where Úrsula Iguarán had sold so many little 
candy animals. 
When José Arcadio Segundo came to he was lying face up 
in the darkness. He realized that he was riding on an endless and 
silent train and that his head was caked with dry blood and that 
all his bones ached. [...] Prepared to sleep for many hours, [...] 
he made himself comfortable on the side that pained him less, 
and only then did he discover that he was lying against dead 
people. [...] Several hours must have passed since the massacre 
because the corpses had the same temperature as a plaster in 
autumn and the same consistency of petrified foam that it had, 
and those who had put them in the car had had time to pile them 
up in the same way in which they transported bunches of bana-
nas. Trying to flee from the nightmare, José Arcadio Segundo 
dra-gged himself from one car to another in the direction in 
which the train was heading, and in the flashes of light that 
broke through the wooden slats as they went through sleeping 
towns he saw the man corpses, woman corpses, child corpses 
who would be thrown into the sea like rejected bananas. 
When he got to the first car he jumped into the darkness and 
lay beside the tracks until the train had passed. It was the longest 
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one he had ever seen, with almost two hundred freight cars and a 
locomotive at either end and a third one in the middle. [...] After 
walking for more than three hours, he was able to make out the 
first houses in the light of dawn. Attracted by the smell of cof-
fee, he went into a kitchen where a woman with a child in her 
arms was leaning over the stove. “Hello,” he said, exhausted. 
“I’m José Arcadio Segundo Buendía.” He pronounced his whole 
name, letter by letter, in order to convince her that he was alive. 
He was wise in doing so, because the woman had thought that 
he was an apparition as she saw the dirty, shadowy figure with 
his head and clothing dirty with blood and touched with the so-
lemnity of death come through the door. [...] José Arcadio 
Segundo did not speak until he had finished drinking his coffee. 
“There must have been three thousand of them,” he mur-
mured. 
“What?” [the woman responds] 
“The dead,” he clarified. “It must have been all of the people 
who were at the station.”  
The woman measured him with a pitying look. “There 
haven’t been any dead here,” she said. “Since the time of your 
uncle, the colonel, nothing has happened in Macondo.”  
In the three kitchens where José Arcadio Segundo stopped 
before reaching home they told him the same thing. “There 
weren’t any dead.” (García Márquez 1972, 309-314. Italics are 
mine) 
 
Every Colombian who reads this passage knows that this 
is none other than the description of what is remembered 
in our history as the “matanza de las bananeras.” As is 
the case with so many of the episodes of mass violence in 
the country, the name that has survived in the collective 
memory refers to the perpetrators instead of the victims as 
the protagonists of the events. The matanza de las ba-
naneras, which could be translated as the “mass assassi-
nation by the banana companies,” is the label given to 
what in fact could be one of the largest undocumented 
massacres in the history of Colombia, namely, the mass 
assassination of the United Fruit Company workers, who 
are the real protagonists of the story, and who were mur-
dered at the hands of the Colombian army on the evening 
of December 5, 1928, in Ciénaga’s train station in the 
Magdalena region under the command of General Carlos 
Cortés Vargas.  
But why start with García Márquez’s telling of the 
story, or more exactly, with José Arcadio Segundo’s re-
collection of the events? Because as unbelievable as 
everything else happening in the novel may seem to those 
who cannot picture Macondo as anything but a magical 
fantasy created by the “unbounded” imagination of the 
novelist, this passage in One Hundred Years of Solitude is 
one of the only “documents” that preserve the memory of 
the matanza in the long history of forgotteness that sur-
rounds the events.4 As it happens to José Arcadio when he 
comes back to Macondo, every single piece of official 
documentation completely denies this version of the 
story. “The official version,” the novel continues,  
 
repeated a thousand times and mangled out all over the country 
by every means of communication the government found at 
hand, was finally accepted: there were no dead, the satisfied 
workers had gone back to their families, and the banana com-
pany was suspending all activity until the rains stopped. (García 
Márquez 1972, 315). 
 
The rains, by the way, do not stop in the novel for four 
years, 11 months and 2 days (cf. García Márquez 1972, 
320), so that every single trace of what happened that 
night in Macondo is entirely washed away, in the novel as 
much as in reality. José Arcadio, as the only survivor of 
the massacre, becomes in the novel also an “invisible” 
witness. García Márquez conveys this masterfully: the 
army that comes searching for José Arcadio is blinded 
before its more than evident presence, his almost trans-
parent body disappears among history’s racks, along 
Melquíades’ innumerable scrolls that contain, as we learn 
at the end of the novel, the complete memory of the 
events as well as the announcement of their radical eras-
ure – the perfect image for an archivist and totalizing 
form of memory, whose fate is to disappear at the very 
moment when its task has been completed.5  
There is no way to know exactly how many workers 
were killed that night in Ciénaga. Several witnesses spoke 
of hundreds of bodies being carried to the train cars. 
Trucks were heard all night long coming and going from 
the town’s streets to the train station.6 Only nine cadavers, 
however, were found the next morning in the town’s main 
square. Nine bodies, some would say, one for each of the 
now dead points of the workers’ petition (cf. Arango 
1981, 97). In General Cortés Vargas’ report, these nine 
bodies are listed together with four more, who are said to 
have died afterwards as a result of severe wounds. 13 
deaths is the official number (cf. Cortés Vargas 1979, 91), 
against the hundreds and even thousands that lived in the 
testimonies of those who were in Ciénaga that night and 
that by now have also died with them.  
The only other “official” document that survives the 
matanza is the speech given the next year before the Con-
gress by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, one of Colombia’s most 
important leftist leaders in the thirties and forties, who 
was also assassinated in 1948, initiating with his death 
one of the most violent periods of partisan conflict in the 
history of Colombia (known as “La Violencia”7). Having 
gone to Ciénaga and its surroundings to investigate the 
facts, Gaitán claims in his speech to have collected en-
ough testimonies to prove the death of more than a thou-
sand people (cf. Gaitán 1997, 24). By contrast with the 
explanations of the General, who contends he gave the 
order to his squad to fire on a group of armed men to 
“prevent a bigger and true massacre” (Cortés Vargas 
1979, 75), Gaitán accuses the General of being one of the 
main participants in a plot between the United Fruit Com-
pany and the Colombian Army (cf. Gaitán 1997, 35), and 
to have imparted the orders to a group of drunken soldiers 
against a sleeping crowd (cf. Gaitán 1997, 111 and 114). 
The witnesses have been bought, Gaitán denounces (cf. 
Gaitán 1997, 75), and the dead bodies have been made to 
disappear by throwing them to the sea and by burying 
them in mass graves in the surrounding land owned by the 
company and local landowners (cf. Gaitán 1997, 116. Cf. 
also Arango 1981, 89ff).  
Despite all of Gaitán’s efforts (which were, of course, 
also politically motivated), nothing was ever proven re-
garding these events, and as much as his speech helped to 
place Gaitán in an advantageous political position, and 
eventually led to establishing some minimal rights for the 
unions and workers in the banana regions, the episode of 
the matanza was completely erased from the official re-
cord. What is left is exactly what García Márquez re-
counts in the novel, namely, the impossible gap between 
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the eye-witness testimonies and the official report, the gap 
left between the 9 bodies found the next morning in 
Ciénaga’s main square, and the more than 3,000 bodies 
that survived in the popular imagination, in the stories 
told from generation to generation, and that García 
Márquez collects in his literary account.8  
One could perhaps argue that the actual truth of the 
events, unknown as it remains today, has been covered up 
even further by the fiction recounted in García Márquez’s 
novel. One could assert indeed from a certain perspective 
that, independently of the intentions that led him to tell 
the story in the novel, the final effect could have back-
fired, redoubling what was already an act of double an-
nihilation –namely, the destruction caused by the ma-
tanza, and the resources that were employed to erase any 
trace of its occurrence. This is the argument given to us 
by Colombian philosopher Ángela Uribe in an article that 
inspired me to write this paper. Uribe argues that, by cap-
turing these two contradictory versions that survive, 
among others, in the historical archive, and by depicting 
them as “equally verisimilar” (Uribe 2010, 48), García 
Márquez’s fictive tale has somehow guaranteed the per-
petuation of the lie, the absolute substitution of the (ab-
sent) truth and the definitive inscription, as a lie and a fic-
tion, in Colombian collective memory. As a result of the 
novelist’s fictionalization of the events, Uribe argues, 
“what prevails is a fantastic tale in which both versions 
have equal incidence in the historical memory” (Uribe 
2010, 48).9 “The unbounded imagination of García 
Márquez,” she continues, has taken away from us the 
possibility of having a “secure place” to remember what 
happened in Ciénaga that night (cf. Uribe 2010, 49). That 
is, a place or a perspective that would allow the truth of 
the events to either be accessed or, at least, recognized as 
completely inaccessible, rather than being replaced by an 
ambiguous and unresolvable claim. By having entirely 
substituted a fictionalized myth for the reality of historical 
events, Uribe contends, the case of the matanza in Co-
lombia proves Hannah Arendt’s famous statement wrong: 
facts are not always more stubborn than lies, sometimes 
they turn out not to be superior to power, and hence per-
suasion and violence cannot only destroy, but also end up 
entirely substituting truth (Uribe 2010, 65-66).10  
As much as I agree with Uribe that the case of the ma-
tanza is a paradigmatic case in the history of oblivion that 
demarcates the relationship between politics and memory 
in Colombia – a relationship that should be made audible 
and denounced every time, as her own paper does in its 
own way – I would like to go back to this paradigmatic 
case and show that perhaps a different conclusion is pos-
sible. 11 I intend to demonstrate that the very specific kind 
of survival that One Hundred Years of Solitude secures 
for the events, against the double erasure accomplished by 
the historical archive, could end up proving Arendt’s 
statement right form a different perspective. I do not think 
that the novel’s fictional account of the events – García 
Márquez’s way of leaving them ‘unsolved,’ allowing for 
both contradictory versions to stand side by side as part of 
a collective memory – is necessarily equivalent to being 
complicit in the erasure of history. And I will show that it 
is precisely because of the literary devices employed by 
García Márquez in his novel that the matanza has resisted 
oblivion. By conserving the traces left by all the attempts 
to make them disappear, the novel preserves the events as 
unforgettable. It preserves them therefore in their stub-
born resistance to being erased from Colombian memory 
and history, even though – Uribe is right about this – they 
have been succesfully replaced by lies in every single of-
ficial record. 
Furthermore, I would like to show that in this sense 
García Márquez’s novel also becomes an example of a 
very powerful response to the kind of challenges posed by 
the attempts of politics and power, persuasion and vio-
lence, to destroy and substitute “historical truths.” I be-
lieve that in such a context, very well known to those of 
us who work on Latin American political history in the 
light of the production and reproduction of colonial struc-
tures of power and temporality, art and literature play an 
invaluable role. The aesthetic dimension of these works 
challenges us to think history and memory anew, perhaps 
no longer, or not only, as an epistemological problem (as 
I think is the case in Uribe’s position), but as an ethical 
one.12 That is, no longer connected to what Uribe de-
scribes as the “secure place” from which historical truth 
could be thought, free from any contamination with fic-
tion, but, on the contrary, as the very difficult task of in-
scribing and denouncing once and again the very mark of 
forgotteness that not only erases history but that also, and 
perhaps even more prominently, constitutes history and 
memory in Latin America.  
 
 
2. “To render our lives believable”: On Literature as 
Resistance to Oblivion 
 
“The world was so recent that many things lacked names, 
and in order to mention them it was necessary to point at 
them” (García Márquez 1972, 1, trans. altered). These are 
some of the first lines we read in One Hundred Years of 
Solitude. The origin and crux of our solitude in Latin 
America, as García Márquez pointed out several times, 
but most famously in his Nobel Prize speech, is that we 
come from a world that does not seem to have words to 
describe it. It is not the excess of imagination, therefore, 
that readers perceive in our literary depictions, García 
Márquez contends. It is rather our reality itself that seems 
to be unbounded (“desmesurada”), “out of all propor-
tion,” he insists, and “this often presents serious problems 
for writers who can’t find words to describe it” (García 
Márquez 1998, 60). 
  
Poets and beggars, musicians and prophets, warriors and scoun-
drels, all creatures of that unbridled reality, we have had to ask 
but little of imagination, for our crucial problem has been a lack 
of conventional means to render our lives believable. This, my 
friends, is the crux of our solitude.13 (García Márquez 1982, em-
phasis added). 
  
More than a mere lack of words, therefore, we are con-
fronted with a lack of meaningful resources to render our 
reality plausible, believable, or, as Alejandro Vallega 
points out when reading these lines by García Márquez, to 
make it heard (cf. Vallega 2009, 155). Latin American 
reality can in this sense challenge us as a reality that lacks 
the appropriate frameworks of meaning to render itself 
communicable, to make itself audible in such a way that 
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what is being told is not only heard but believed, under-
stood as possible in the realm of the real. It is not only 
words, therefore, but also an entire grammar that needs to 
be created from scratch if one is to render this reality 
audible.14  
The problem, therefore, is not that the “unbounded 
imagination” of the writer has substituted fiction for re-
ality, rendering it impossible to build a memory from a 
“secure place,” beyond the literary myths that are, for 
Uribe, complicit in the erasures of history. The problem is 
rather the opposite: how are we to render these experi-
ences, these lives and deaths that seem to be imagined as 
something real? How can we make them audible, com-
municable, and integrate them in the realms of experi-
ence, memory, and history? How are we to listen to what 
could otherwise be reduced to fiction when seen from the 
perspective of a traditional framework of knowledge?  
When García Márquez expresses the difficulty of ren-
dering an unbounded reality real, of rendering it believ-
able, he is speaking of the specific situation of coloniality 
in the Americas. “The interpretation of our reality through 
patterns not our own,” he writes, “serves only to make us 
ever more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary” 
(García Márquez 1982a).15 As we learn from Fanon (to 
bring here just one of the most well-known articulations 
of this problem), the world of the colonized is initially 
perceived as one “where words wrap themselves in si-
lence” (Fanon 2008, 199), where every image is already a 
product of the colonizer, and, hence, reality does not seem 
to find its place in the world of experience, does not seem 
to touch and affect in any way the language that we try to 
use to refer to it.16 Like the insomnia disease that affects 
the residents of Macondo, this cannot but lead to “a state 
of hallucinated lucidity,” where every image is like the 
image coming out of the dream of someone else (“the 
ones would see the images dreamed by the others,” Gar-
cía Márquez writes (46, trans. modified)),17 and where the 
final result, as we very soon find out in the novel, is a 
state of total amnesia, “a kind of idiocy that has no past” 
(García Márquez 1972, 45). In this case, the experience of 
coloniality makes it impossible to have a history and a 
memory in the conventional sense of these words.18 What 
is at stake here is also an urgent demand to rethink our 
traditional accounts of history and memory, precisely be-
cause such experiences of institutional forgetfulness rep-
resent a radical challenge to our traditional (inherited) 
frameworks of meaning and signification. 
It is in this context that I also hear striking similarities 
with what philosophy has said in relation to, and in re-
sponse to, extreme forms of violence and trauma. Going 
back once more to Arendt, this time however to The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism, one encounters, in the aftermath 
of the Second World War, a strong claim for the need to 
produce new frameworks of meaning in the face of the 
destruction, but also of the horrific originality, of the 
events that the testimonies coming out of the camps are 
attempting to convey.19 The stories told by the survivors 
of the camps, Arendt writes, seem to come to us “from 
another planet” (Arendt 1967, 445), and refer more to a 
“nightmare” than to any possible reality (cf. Arendt 1967, 
439). Those attempting to tell and convey their stories, to 
make them believable (going back to the quote from Gar-
cía Márquez), feel like they have survived a horrible 
dream, a hallucinated reality. Not even the survivors, Ar-
endt writes, seem to believe what their testimonies are at-
tempting to render imaginable with little success. 
There are no parallels to the life in the concentration camps. Its 
horror can never be fully embraced by the imagination for the 
very reason that it stands outside of life and death. It can never 
be fully reported for the very reason that the survivor returns to 
the world of the living, which makes it impossible for him [sic] 
to believe fully in his [sic] own past experiences. (Arendt 1967, 
444). 
 
It seems impossible to integrate the tales told by the “liv-
ing dead” in the world of the living. It seems equally im-
possible to listen to these testimonies, because they seem 
to bring with them the end of reality as we know it, the 
absolute collapse of all the frameworks that have made it 
possible for us to make sense of our world (cf. Arendt 
1967, 446).  
What is interesting in the case of Arendt’s analysis, 
specifically in The Origins of Totalitarianism, published 
for the first time in 1950 when even the “truth” of the tes-
timonies of the survivors was still very much in doubt in 
the minds of many of her readers, is the way she manages 
to displace the discussion about the “credibility” of the 
testimonies towards the question of listening. What is nee-
ded, she claims, is the production of new categories of 
thought, new resources for meaning, that will make it 
possible to listen to what remains unheard in survivors’ 
testimonies, because what remains unheard will also re-
main “unintelligible” (cf. Arendt 1994, 310). 
Thus, for Arendt, what we are facing, in the impos-
sible gap between testimony and history, between the lan-
guage of the witnesses and “reality as we know it,” is not 
a matter of credibility and verifiability, of being able to 
have a “secure place” on which we could build a memory 
and a history of the events in the traditional sense of these 
words (this is what I have described above as an episte-
mological question, concerned, as seems to be the case 
with Uribe’s position, with creating the adequate condi-
tions for the production of verifiable truths). The chal-
lenge posed by the “horrible originality” of the camps is, 
for Arendt, how to produce what García Márquez’s de-
scribes as the means that would render our lives believ-
able. “Only the fearful imagination”, Arendt writes, “can 
afford to keep thinking about horrors” (Arendt 1967, 
441). It is imagination that allows us to find within our-
selves, precisely where “we have lost yardsticks by which 
to measure, and rules under which to subsume the particu-
lar, the possibility to understand without preconceived 
categories and to judge without the set of customary 
rules” (Arendt 1994, 321). Only imagination makes it 
possible “to understand something which has ruined our 
categories of thought and our standards of judgment ap-
pears thus less frightening” (Arendt 1994, 312).20  
This is also entailed in García Márquez’s conception 
of what literature can do in the context of, and in response 
to, coloniality. For Arendt, the creation (every time anew) 
of these new frameworks of meaning, these new gram-
mars, as I have called them, is the only way to respond to 
the urgent demand posed by the horrors of totalitarian 
violence. Only by making it possible to truly listen to the 
testimonies of survivors, can these grammars offer a kind 
of historical justice that can neither be provided (at least 
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not entirely) by the legal realm, nor by traditional and, in 
García Márquez’s analysis, colonized, forms of history 
and memory.21 These are the real stakes of “truth telling,” 
according to Arendt, the task that is afforded to the histor-
ian, the storyteller, but also and perhaps more so, to “the 
(solitude of the) philosopher and the (isolation of the) ar-
tist” (Arendt 1977, 255). It is only in the displacement of 
the structures that make it impossible to listen to the radi-
cal singularity of the real, in the creation of new frame-
works and new realms of signification, that “facts” can 
survive, stubbornly, no matter how much violence at-
tempts to destroy them and substitute them with lies.  
Such is also, in García Márquez’s words, “the ever-
lasting victory of poetry against the powers of death” 
(García Márquez 1982b).22 Reality, as the source and the 
result of the power of imagination, always resists the tell-
ing of lies in literature.23 “And lies,” he insists, “are more 
serious in literature than in real life” (García Márquez 
1998, 31). The kind of survival that literature can offer to 
the events surrounding the matanza in Ciénaga in 1928 is 
thus neither a perpetuation of these events as mere lies, 
nor a replacement of the truth with a myth that makes it 
impossible to decide between two contradictory versions 
of the story. By instituting a new grammar, a new frame-
work of signification that displaces precisely the distinc-
tion between truth and fiction – and hence puts into ques-
tion the very possibility of having a “secure place” from 
which to remember (cf. Uribe 2010, 49) – the novel offers 
a site for a remembrance of another kind.  
Thus, what survives in and through the novel is not 
the truth of the events, but rather the truth—the mark and 
the trace—of their history; a history that is stamped by the 
very act of erasure and forgotteness. The novel inscribes 
the impossibility of remembering that surrounds the oblit-
eration of the matanza from the public record and the o-
fficial history. To make use here of Cathy Caruth’s lan-
guage – and trusting therefore, as Glissant suggests, that a 
certain parallel between trauma, coloniality and memory 
can be more than a mere “intellectual game” (Glissant 
1999, 66)24– one could say that the novel “bears witness 
to the disappeared past,” passing on “the evidence of an 
event that can no longer be reduced to the simple referent 
of any language” (Caruth 2013 67, 71). Literature shows 
here its own potentiality to become a site of memory, only 
and exclusively by its capacity to actively resist and ins-
cribe the effects of forgotteness—to inscribe them by re-
sisting them, to resist them by inscribing them. In a way, 
then, the novel enacts what it cannot recall, moving away 
from an idea of history and memory as representation, 
towards a notion of remembrance understood instead as 
the “recreation of the very experience of the loss.”25  
By presenting the past as that which can never be fully 
present, namely, as that which always exceeds the very 
same possibilities of its own representation, the novel is 
capable of evoking what has been made unforgettable by 
its inscription, preserved without being remembered, con-
serving it in its resistance to oblivion. The act—the enact-
ing—of the novel is itself the sign that memory can make 
history in its erasures; a memory and history oriented ex-
clusively by an ethical demand, namely, to listen and to 
render audible the erasure of the voices of those who 
would otherwise remain entirely unheard, completely for-
gotten. 
3. After the Traces of Macondo, between the Archive 
and Oblivion: José Alejandro Restrepo’s Musa Para-
disiaca26 
 
For anyone who enters the gallery and encounters, at first 
sight, the bunches of bananas hanging from the ceiling, 
invading the air of the room with their rotten fragrance 
(cf. image 1), this work cannot but remind us, once again, 
of the matanza. José Alejandro Restrepo’s Musa Para-
disíaca is the continuation of the story of this untold old 
truth, and of the consequences its multiple erasures still 
produce in the present. If García Márquez’s literary ac-
count of the events has inscribed them effectively as un-
forgettable, as I was suggesting above, I would like to 
suggest that Restrepo’s installation serves as a constant 
reminder that, as long as their erasure is not effectively 
recollected and recounted, it will continue haunting the 
present in its stubborn latency, in its claim for a place and 
a site for its remembrance. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Restrepo. Musa Paradisiaca, second floor, FLORA, 2016 
 
Musa summons us from the abyssal gap between myth 
and history that One Hundred Years of Solitude has left 
open. The work speaks to us, once again, from the site 
occupied by the unmemorable figure of the matanza and 
its unrecoverable archive. What is at stake here, however, 
is not only the claim for a history that has not yet been 
told, whose absence the work eloquently proclaims. Re-
strepo’s work also speaks of the history that develops 
from this absence, and the repetitive and ongoing effects 
this silence continues to generate – and to generate, once 
again, as officially and institutionally erased – in Colom-
bia’s present. The work performs, in its multiple installa-
tions, the historical repetition of the original massacre, its 
transformations and translations into the ongoing violence 
that the exploitation of banana production by foreign in-
vestors has continued to cause in the country up to the 
present, and the complications of this history in its con-
nection to paramilitary violence in the late eighties and 
nineties in the Urabá region.27 Musa is an ongoing search; 
a search for a form of representation, a language, a 
grammar, that can bear witness to the erasure of the 
events, their compulsive historical repetition, and the 
stubbornness with which they have managed to resist 
oblivion – all at the same time. 
MARÍA DEL ROSARIO ACOSTA LÓPEZ 
 168 
 
 
Fig. 2. Restrepo. Musa Paradisiaca, first floor, FLORA, 2016. 
 
Everything in the installation seems to be about the ways 
in which Restrepo has attempted to produce and inaugu-
rate these particular grammars. Everything in the work 
comes from the site of its forgotteness, inscribing in its 
anachronic temporalities its ongoing resistance to being 
left behind. We encounter first, covering the walls of the 
gallery, the “archival” part of the installation (cf. image 
2): the numerous pieces of newspapers and journals that 
Restrepo has been collecting over the more than 20 years 
since the first installation of this work.28 Cutouts that, in 
spite of the years, refuse to fade away – as usually ha-
ppens with old newspapers. They all welcome us in the 
first floor of the gallery quietly denouncing what offi-
cially continues to be unrecognized, namely, the ongoing 
violence perpetrated by the banana companies in the north 
part of Colombia; deaths that are presented in the official 
records as related to “another” conflict, the war between 
guerrilla and paramilitaries, a conflict that refuses to see 
itself as entirely connected to the history of colonization 
and recolonization of Colombian territory by foreign in-
vestors. 
We then climb the stairs to the darkened second floor 
of the gallery, towards what is perhaps the most striking 
and powerful part of the installation: the 13 banana 
bunches hanging from the ceiling (cf. image 1 and 3). 
One can only hear the noise that they make while they 
balance, being moved by those of us walking through the 
invisible aisles, and the almost imperceptible sounds com-
ing out of the videos that are being projected on the floor 
of the gallery; recordings of journalists who have been 
documenting the ongoing massacres in the banana re-
gions, most of which never made it to the news and have 
been discovered and preserved by Restrepo’s judicious 
research. These banana bunches, imposing, decomposing, 
almost invisible in the blackness of the gallery (our eyes 
need to wait before they start to appear in the darkness of 
the room), cannot but remind us of those corpses, innu-
merable, uncounted and unaccounted for; barely sug-
gested by the images projected on circular mirrors in the 
floor; mere reflections and reminders of the untold and 
ongoing history of the matanzas de las bananeras, in plu-
ral, from Ciénaga (undocumented), to the Urabá (doc-
umented but forgotten, unnoticed and almost silenced, 
like the videos), to the present. How to mourn those 
corpses when the history about their deaths has not even 
been written yet?  
 
 
Fig. 3. Restrepo. Musa Paradisiaca, second floor, FLORA, 2016. 
 
Finally, in the upper floor of the gallery, in a room full of 
light, the images that complete the rest of the installation. 
We see the repetitions and reenactments of the engraving 
that originally gave title to the exhibition (cf. image 4), an 
image that tells the story of how this installation came to 
be, when Restrepo discovered the productive ambiguity 
created by the title of the image, Musa Paradisíaca, refe-
rring not to the mulata sitting at its bottom (as our 
colonized eyes would have trained us to see), but to the 
scientific name of the depicted banana tree. The image is 
surrounded by depictions of the “forbidden fruit,” to-
gether with ironic and erotic references to iconic repre-
sentations of the religious scene.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Restrepo. Musa Paradisiaca, third floor, detail, FLORA, 2016. 
 
Across the room, Doré’s engravings of the “expulsion of 
paradise;” that moment when myth and history coincide 
and erase one another, when each becomes just one side 
of the other’s face. The image is framed and surrounded 
by hallucinogen mushrooms (cf. image 5), reminding us 
of the ambiguous but decisive colonial entanglements be-
tween hallucination and memory, myth, history and re-
ality. Is Colombian history perhaps that a hallucinated 
dream? That “state of hallucinated lucidity” that One 
Hundred Years of Solitude relates, as mentioned above, 
with the disease, spread out through Macondo, of the dis-
appearance of memory, that results, according to the 
novel, in an “idiocy” without a past (cf. García Márquez 
1972, 46)? Or is it perhaps the invitation of Restrepo’s 
work to dream history anew, to reclaim its territory be-
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yond the realm of the visible, and into the ominous realms 
of all those haunting figures of the past that always man-
age to seep through the porous multiple layers of the 
present?  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Musa Paradisiaca, third floor, detail, FLORA, 2016. 
 
Archive, mourning and history, these are the three sides 
of a work that seems to be calling out for the need and the 
urgency to interrupt a traditional interpretation of these 
terms, to dislocate their use as accomplices in a history of 
forgotteness that the installation attempts to subvert. 
Thus, in the place of an archival will to closure – which is 
nothing but the other face of oblivion – we encounter the 
stubbornness of the unarchivable, the belatedness of an 
‘unresolved’ excess that refuses to be left out of history, 
even if its truth may dwell forever in a sort of irrecover-
able past. In the place of bodies to bury and names to 
mourn, the work invites us to remember the corpses that 
have been erased from history, hundreds of suspended 
graves that can only be inscribed in their erasure, in their 
survival as disappeared, as having been deprived of a 
proper wake. Finally, there is the resurgence of history 
and its amnesias, from the myth of colonization to a pres-
ent colonized by its own myths. Musa paradisíaca in-
augurates and installs, in all these very singular images, 
and through the force of its quiet, patient, and repetitive 
modes of denunciation, a grammar capable of reminding 
us of the need, the urgency and the task of moving from 
the indecidability of an erased history, to the decisive in-
scription of its memory.  
If García Márquez, in One Hundred Years of Solitude, 
illustrates how memory can make history precisely by 
erasing it, Restrepo’s Musa succeeds in reminding us that 
this erasure marks precisely the site of its remembrance – 
in its non-localizable, ambiguous, and undecidable char-
acter, indeed, as the novel recalls, but even further, per-
haps, in the decisiveness of its inscription in the present. 
As it is the case with the “unforgettable,” the event sur-
vives in its belated character, as that which cannot be en-
tirely remembered, but stubbornly resists, nonetheless, as 
the “not yet” of an unresolved past; indeed, a past that is 
yet to be remembered, whose history has not yet been 
written. Is this not what happens in and with One Hun-
dred Years of Solitude? Do we not learn in the end that 
what we are reading is just perhaps the traces of a history 
that has turned itself into ashes? Let us recall the last lines 
of the novel: 
  
Before reaching the final line, however, he [Aureliano] had al-
ready understood that he would never leave that room, for it was 
foreseen that the city of mirrors (or mirages) would be wiped out 
by the wind and exiled from the memory of men at the precise 
moment when Aureliano Babilonia would finish deciphering the 
parchments, and that everything written on them was unrepeat-
able since time immemorial and forever more, because races 
condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a sec-
ond opportunity on earth. (García Márquez 1967, 422). 
 
By opening grammars where the claims of this erasure 
cannot be made silent, literature and art – and perhaps 
only literature and art – prove that the erasure announced 
in the last lines of the novel may not be the only destiny 
available for those “races condemned to one hundred 
years of solitude.”  
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Notes 
 
1 The following is the final version of a lecture I originally gave at the 
University of Oregon by invitation of Alejandro Vallega. I also presen-
ted a shorter version of this essay in Cornell University by invitation of 
Gustavo Quintero, and in a workshop on Literature and Violence in Ber-
lin organized by Ilit Ferber, Adam Lipszyc, Nassima Sahraoui, and Ca-
roline Sauter. I thank everyone in all these events for their wonderful 
questions and suggestions. I also thank Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez at 
DePaul University, who not only has read several versions of this and 
other articles on this subject during the last two years, but who is also an 
indispensable interlocutor of my work on trauma and listening. Finally, 
thanks to Colin McQuillan for proof-reading this version, and for having 
become such an essential listener of my work.  
2 My own clumsy translation: “Poetry… the secret energy of our every-
day life that boils the chickpeas in the kitchen, spreads love around and 
repeats the images in the mirrors.”  
3 “The dangerous memory of our people … an energy capable of moving 
the world.” 
4 It is very telling, in this sense, that the report collecting oral testimo-
nies of the matanza, published by Carlos Arango Z. in 1981, mentions 
One Hundred Years of Solitude as the closest there is to an otherwise 
complete absent record of the massacre in Colombian archival history 
(cf. Arango 1981, 27). 
5 For a comparison between an archivist and totalizing form of memory, 
and one that, by contrast, allows for history to survive in its undecidibi-
lity and lack of closure, see Walter Benjamin’s “The Storyteller” (cf. 
also Acosta López 2017).  
6 Cf. some of the oral testimonies gathered by Arango (cf. 1981), parti-
cularly Chapter 3 and 4, 63-102.  
7 Cf. Ángela Uribe’s contribution to this volume, and the work of María 
Victoria Uribe on this historical period in Colombia’s history, cited and 
analyzed in her paper.  
8 In an interview to García Márquez for a British radio show years later 
(1991), the author confesses that in his research for the novel he very 
soon realized that the massacre could not have been as spectacular as the 
collective memory had remembered it. He admits to have exaggerated 
the events to be able to “fill out all the cars in the train” (cf. García Már-
quez, quoted by Marco Palacios and Frank Safford (2002, 520)). I thank 
Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez for the reference to this interview. This, ho-
wever, only helps to prove the point I am about to make, namely, that 
literature finds its own forms of resistance, even if not “objectively” 
accurate, when everything else leads to radical forms of oblivion.  
9 The translation of this and every other quote from Uribe’s paper is my 
own.  
10 Arendt’s famous assertion goes as follows: “In their stubbornness, 
facts are superior to power [...] Persuasion and violence can destroy 
truth, but they cannot replace it.” (Arendt 1977, 255) 
11 I find Uribe’s piece very inspiring, and very much in continuity with 
all the work she has been recently doing in relation to the history and 
philosophy of violence in Colombia. A lot of the archival work that sup-
ports my paper has been oriented by her investigation, and I also owe to 
her, and not only to her paper, but to her classes and conversations, the 
reference to Arendt as an important resource to rethink history in the 
contexts of both coloniality and trauma. I would like to think of this pa-
per, therefore, as a continuation of a conversation that we once started, 
and as my way to take up her challenge of thinking philosophically from 
a specific situated geographical and historical context. For a wonderful 
sample of Uribe’s work cf. her book Perfiles del mal en la historia de 
Colombia (2009).  
12 I am not claiming that Uribe does not consider the ethical consequen-
ces of what she formulates initially as an epistemological problem. I am 
rather claiming, as I am about to show, that García Márquez inaccurate 
 
 
and ambiguous depiction of the events (and therefore epistemologically 
problematic, according to Uribe’s argument), is however ethically driven 
and brings to light the kind of resistance that literature can provide in a 
context of radical archival erasure.  
13 “Poetas y mendigos, músicos y profetas, guerreros y malandrines, 
todas las criaturas de aquella realidad desaforada hemos tenido que pe-
dirle muy poco a la imaginación, porque el desafío mayor para nosotros 
ha sido la insuficiencia de los recursos convencionales para hacer creíble 
nuestra vida. Este es, amigos, el nudo de nuestra soledad” (García 
Márquez 1982b).  
14 On the question of “grammar” here and how it connects to the que-
stion of the coloniality of language, I have written elsewhere (cf. Acosta 
López 2018a). My emphasis on an unheard reality, and on the need to 
develop new grammars of listening to convey what otherwise remains 
inaudible – “inaudito,” in Spanish, with the double connotation of “un-
heard” and “unacceptable”– comes also in connection to my recent work 
on trauma and memory and the need to produce what García Márquez 
describes in these passages as the “means to render our lives believable.” 
This implies producing frameworks of meaning that may allow for an 
erased reality –the silences imposed by history- to resonate (even if only 
in its absence) and be listened to, to be made believable and hence in-
telligible, even if there are no pre-existent “conventional” means to ma-
ke this task possible. Those means, I contend, need to be produced, and 
literature and art are paradigmatic examples of how this takes shape in 
places like Colombia. For further developments of this topic cf. Acosta 
López 2018a, 2019, and my forthcoming book, Grammars of Listening: 
Philosophical Approaches to Trauma and Memory.   
15 “La interpretación de nuestra realidad con esquemas ajenos sólo con-
tribuye a hacernos cada vez más desconocidos, cada vez menos libres, 
cada vez más solitarios” (García Márquez, 1982b).  
16 I am here referring also to the very clear analysis Alejandro Vallega 
offers of Fanon in the context of the coloniality of images (cf. Vallega 
2011, 210-218). The problem, as Vallega formulates it, is not only how 
the colonizer imposes a language, or not, but also how “one’s own 
vision” (as the colonized) “one’s very possibility of knowledge through 
images has been colonized” (218), and what needs to be done in order to 
displace colonial images and produce new forms of visuality. I would 
like to take this further and insist on other forms of “audibility,” together 
with an emphasis on a decolonization of frameworks of meaning, as 
well as of our colonized forms of aesthetics, very much in the line of 
what Vallega proposes in his most recent book (2014).  
17 On this idea of “dreaming someone else’s dream” and on being dre-
amt by others, see Diego Cagüeñas’s contribution to this volume, also 
very closely connected to the possibility of producing other grammars 
and other sites of resistance to forgetfulness; alternative memories for 
mourning, remembering and working through what history and violence 
have insistently attempted to erase.  
18 See also in this volume Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez’s articulation of 
this very same issue in connection to Édouard Glissant’s work. I would 
suggest that what Gualdrón analyzes in his essay as the creative possibi-
lities underlying the non-history of the Caribbean, are not very far away 
from what I am calling in this same context the need and the urgency of 
grammars of listening, as a way of articulating new possibilities for the 
present, while resisting constitutive structures of erasure of the colonial 
(and the coloniality of the) past.  
19 I have argued elsewhere for the importance of the two sides of A-
rendt’s argument here, namely, the destructive character of an ontologi-
cal violence, like that of the camps, but also the horrific originality of 
what this violence is capable of introducing as radically new in the re-
alm of the possible (cf. Acosta López 2018 b and 2019). I think that it is 
important to take these two sides into account in any attempt to reflect 
philosophically on the possibilities (and impossibilities) of language to 
convey horror, or, as I am arguing in the present paper, on the possibili-
ties of resisting historical and political erasure. In its capacity for “era-
sability,” as Banu Bargu argues, post-colonial forms of sovereignty are 
also able to produce alternative regimes of visibility, designed precisely 
to sustain and make as “visible” as possible their invisible threat, that is, 
their capacity of rendering invisible and inaudible their own constitutive 
forms of violence (cf. Bargu 2014, 62ff). It is therefore to the productive 
and creative sides of violence, as much as to their destructive effects, 
that an aesthetics and ethics of resistance needs to attend to.  
20 In later works Arendt will develop in more depth the ways this possi-
bility is available to philosophical understanding through the power of 
imagination. She will relate it to Kant’s Third Critique, offering a rea-
ding of Kant’s reflective judgment and his idea of the exemplarity of the 
judgment of taste. It is also connected to this exemplarity of the aesthetic 
experience, and the capacity of the aesthetic judgment to be regulated by 
a rule that cannot be determined but that is nonetheless produced every 
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single time anew in the face of the singularity (and unclassifiable cha-
racter) of the beautiful, that I have conceived the notion of “grammar” 
mentioned above. I cannot develop this here. For a more developed e-
xplanation of this concept, see Grammars of Listening (Forthcoming). 
21 Walter Benjamin is tacitly present at this point in Arendt’s text in the 
figure of ‘the storyteller,’ and in the urgent need for the recovery of the 
value of communicable experience that goes together, hand in hand, 
with a gift for listening that, according to Benjamin, is rapidly disappea-
ring and being substituted by modern experiences of isolated forms of 
language (the novel and information are his main examples in his essay 
on this issue, cf. Benjamin 1968, 83-110). His reflections in the essay 
are directed to the recovery of a kind of memory that only the experien-
ce of language in storytelling is able to give life to and preserve. Benja-
min is also responding in his text to the problem of trauma after the war 
(this time, however, the silence of the soldiers coming back from the 
first World War) and his essay can offer a very fecund introduction to 
the 12th Chapter of Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism. For a more 
detailed analysis of Benjamin’s The Storyteller in the light of these pre-
occupations see “The Storyteller’s Silence” in Felman 2002, and Acosta 
López 2017.  
22 Curiously enough, the concluding paragraphs of García Márquez’s 
Nobel prize speech, where he talks about the victory of poetry against 
the powers of death, are never translated in the English versions; the 
translation here is my own.  
23 “With time, I discovered that you can’t invent or imagine whatever 
you fancy because then you risk not telling the truth, and lies are more 
serious in literature than in real life. [...] I think that imagination is just 
an instrument for producing reality and that the source of creation is 
always, in the last instance, reality” (García Márquez 1998, 31).  
24 Cf. in this collection Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez’s contribution, and his 
analysis of the possibilities and limits of this parallel between coloniality 
and trauma.  
25 The expression comes originally from an unpublished text by Daniel 
Moreno. I have used it in some of my previous work to talk about the 
very singular role art has played in Colombia in the context of a resi-
stance to a history of oblivion and forgetfulness, and in reference to spe-
cific works of art by Oscar Muñoz, Doris Salcedo and Juan Manuel E-
chavarría (cf. Acosta López 2014, cf. Moreno’s chapter in that same 
volume, and his reading of José Alejandro Restrepo’s El caballero de la 
fe).  
26 The following section is a longer version of what I wrote originally for 
the catalogue of the exhibition of Musa in Flora in 2016 (Cf. Restrepo et 
al. 2016, 111-120. For another reaction to this very same installation, cf. 
Bruno Mazzoldi’s contribution to this issue.  
27 In this sense, Restrepo’s insistence in reinstalling the work, once and 
again, is also a performative inscription of the ongoing history of this 
violence in Colombia. The archival work is therefore always in the ma-
king. The excess of documentation contrasts with the relative invisibility 
that characterizes these events in Colombia and the kind of impunity that 
still today surrounds the events connected to paramilitary violence and 
political violence against the unions in the Urabá region.  
28 Part of this archive can also be consulted in the catalogue of the exhi-
bition at FLORA (cf. Restrepo et al. 2006, 37-110). The catalogue also 
includes excerpts of the above-mentioned speech by Jorge Eliécer Gai-
tán before Congress in 1928.  
